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COMMENT
MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION FOR COMPULSORY
AMENDMENT IN FLORIDA
Prior to the adoption of the new common-law rules in this state, trouble-
some questions arbse as to the use and application of the motion to. strike and
the motion for compulsory amendment. Although those difficulties in practice
and pleading may be obviated by the adoption of the new rules, nevertheless
a discussion of the old procedure may be of aid for a better understanding of
the rules. With this in mind, the present comment is an attempt to briefly survey
the history and use of the compulsory amendment and motion to strike and
their status under the recently adopted rules.
At common law the demurrer arose as a method of attacking any defect
(except duplicity) in the pleadings of the opposing parties.' The court exer-
cised its jurisdiction in its use of the demurrer as one of its inherent powers.
Thereafter, because of abuses that arose in the manner in which the court up-
held the application of a demurrer, procedures were adopted under the statute
of 27 Eliz. C. 5 and 4 and 5 Anne (1705) which required that the grounds the
demurrer was predicated upon be specified and used only as a means of attack
against certain enumerated defects. 2 The effect of these various statutes gave,
rise to two demurrers, namely, the general demurrer and the special demurrer.
The function of the general demurrer was to admit the facts well pleaded and
to test their sufficiency in setting forth a cause of action or defense. The
special demurrer was to test the form of the pleadings and such procedural
matters that did not go to the substance of the cause of action. The English
law remained as such until the adoption of the common law procedure act of
1852, which abolished special demurrers. 3 Since the common law of England
was adopted in Florida both general and special demurrers were recognized
until the enactment of chapter 1096, p. 28, laws 1861.1
This law, which abolished special demurrers, embodied provisions for
the use of the motion to strike and compulsory amendment in its stead. The
pertinent section of the statute is :
"If any pleading be so framed as to prejudice or embarrass or delay the.
fair trial of the action the opposite party may apply to tire court to strike out
1. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., v. Benedict Pineapple Co., 52 Fla. 165, 42 So. 529 (1906)
(concurring opinion of Chief Justice Shackleford).
2. Supra.
3. Sutra.
4. §§ 14 and 15 of this law, based upon §§ So and 51 of the common law procedure
act had the effect of abolishing special demurrers.
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or amend such pleading, and the court shall make such order respecting the
same, and also respecting the costs, as it shall see fit." ' (Emphasis added).
The office of the motion to strike was to test the form of the pleadings;
therefore, the motion to strike grew out of and replaced the special demurrer.6
In discussing the motion to strike, Justice Kirkpatrick in a memorandum opin-
ion remarked that, "From time immemorial, courts have stricken false pleas
from the record .. .in order to prevent the records from being unnecessarily
encumbered." 7 Thus, it is seen, that in its inherent power the court permitted
pleadings to be attacked first by way of demurrer and later by motion to strike.
The functions of the motion to strike were set forth by statutory enact-
ment. The similarity between the English Statute 8 and the Florida Statute is
noteworthy. The English law provides that the court or judge may strike out
any matter in any indorsement of pleading which is unnecessarily scandalous,
or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action ;
as compared to the Florida Statute, which states that if the pleading be framed
to prejudice or embarrass the fair trial of the action, the opposite party may
apply to the court to strike out or to amend such pleading.
The principles of the common law general demurrer and special demurrer
are found in Florida in the functions performed by the demurrer and motion
to strike, since the motion to strike grew out of and replaced the common law
special demurrer.9 A general demurrer goes to the pleading as an entirety
for insufficiency, while a motion to strike, which is the equivalent of the special
demurrer, is applicable where the pleading either as an entirety or in part is
wholly irrelevant or for any reason improper. 10
Since this comment is limited to the distinction between a motion to
strike and a motion for compulsory amendment, a further discussion of the
general demurrer is not included.
A motion to strike fulfills many functions and purposes. It is the proper
cure for redundancy or repetition," as well as sham pleas.' 2
Another use is for frivolous pleas, i.e. those having no place in the particu-
lar pleading wherein they are contained.'9
5. This section was brought forward into the Revised Statutes of 1892, § 1043; like-
wise carried forward into the General Statutes of 1906, § 1433; again forward into the
Revised General Statutes of 1920, § 2630; also carried forward into the Compiled General
Laws of 1927, § 4296; and finally in FLA. STAT. 1941, § 50.21.
6. Hall v. O'Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So, 609 (1908) ; Florida East
Coast R.R., v. Peters, 72 Fla. 311, 73 So. 151 (1916).
7. Anonymous, 7 N.J.L. 160 (Sup. Ct.) (1824).
8. Vol. XXV, I-alsbury's Laws of England 418, § 4 (1937 ed.).
9. See note 6 supra.
10. Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Putnal, 57 Fla. 199, 49 So. 922 (1909).
11. Hubbard v. Anderson, 50 Fla. 219, 39 So. 107 (1905) (where there was a plea
to the general issue and additional pleas amounting to the general issue were interposed,
such additional pleas were stricken).
12. Rhea v. Hackney, 117 Fla. 62, 157 So. 190 (1934) (when it appeared that a plead-
ing had been interposed for delay or other unworthy motive with no reasofiable expec-
tation that it could be sustained at trial of issue, it was stricken).
13. In an action on a contract, a plea of set-off of damages arising out of a tort
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Where a plea contains two defenses to a declaration, one of which is in-
applicable, it may be attacked by a motion to strike. 14 And, equitable pleas,
founded upon wholly equitable grounds, while they are proper in courts of
equity have no place in a court of law and are properly removed by a motion
to strike.'5
Moreover, while a simple objection can be used to prevent a response to
an improper question, where the answer is not responsive a motion to strike
the answer should be made. 16 Also, testimony conditionally received on as-
surance that a foundation will later be laid, which condition is not fulfilled,
should be stricken either by a motion of the court or the opposing party.' 7 The
motion to strike is also used when the pleading is scandalous as in a case where
a declaration alleged that "the defendant, by perjury, procured a verdict against
this plaintiff, and had a judgment entered thereon." 18
The compulsory amendment,' 9 along with the motion to strike,20 stemmed
from the abolished common law special demurrer. The statute, which created
these motions, is silent as to when the motion to strike is the appropriate pro-
cedure or when the motion for compulsory amendment should he used. What is
equally significant is the fact that it appears as though Florida is the only
state that uses a "compulsory amendment" for the purpose of attacking a de-
fective pleading. Generally, the common practice among other states is to
attack the defective pleading by demurrers, motions to strike or motions to
dismiss.
The uses and application of a motion for compulsory amendment are
varied. In the case of Cooney-Eckstein Co. v. King,2' the court stated that
when a good defense is defectively made, or a plea that is only wanting in
explicitness or fullness, it should not be stricken out, but a. motion for compul-
sory amendment should be filed. It also said, that when the description of an
object involved is insufficient to enable you to plead with certainty, a compul-
sory amendment is proper.
A second use for the compulsory amendment is in instances of duplicity,
which arises when two distinct causes of action are joined in the same count. 22
The motion is also appropriate where there are defects in matter of form or
action is purely frivolous and properly stricken on motion. Brash ,X. Eheman, 56 Fla.
153, 47 So. 937 (1908).
14. Armstrong v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 85 Fla. 126, 95 So. 506 (1923).
15. Bacon v. Green, 36 Fla. 325, 18 So. 870 (1895). Pleas interposed on equitable
grounds in an action at law which present no defense cognizable on such ground, may
be attacked by a motion to strike.
16. Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Sloane, 52 Fla. 257, 42 So. 516 (1906).
17. Wilson v. Journigin, 57 Fla. 277, 49 So. 44 (1909).
18. Ropes v. Stewart, 54 Fla. 185, 45 So. 31 (1907).
19. Seaboard Air Line R.R., v. Rentz, 60 Fla. 429, 54 So. 13 (1910) ; Atlantic Coast-
line R.PR., v. Wallace, 61 Fla. 93, 54 So. 893 (1911). (The authority for the compulsory
amendment and motion to strike is found within F.S.A. § 50.21).
20. See note 6 supra.
21. 69 Fla. 246, 67 So. 918 (1915).
22. E. A. Strout Farm Agency v. Hollingsworth, 92 Fla. 673, 110 So. 267 (1926t
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in the manner of stating a cause of action which makes the declaration insuf-
ficient in substance. 23
Where there is a misnomer in a declaration, a plea in abatement in a per-
sonal action is not allowed, but a correct result is reached upon defendant's
motion for compulsory amendment, which requires the plaintiff to insert the
proper name in his declaration. 24 If a declaration contains allegations that
are irrelevant, redundant, or framed in such form as to unduly prejudice the
other party, though otherwise appropriate and relevant, and this declaration
doesn't wholly fail to state a cause of action, the proper remedy for this situa-
tion is a motion for compulsory amendment3 5
As concerns the procedural aspects of both the motion to strike and com-
pulsory amendment, the following discussion may cast some light. A plaintiff
may ignore the motions and ask that a default be entered when the motion is
frivolous and without merit, and such that a determination of the motion
either on behalf or in opposition to the plaintiff would not affect his right
to proceed. The clerk of the court is also justified in entering default and judg-
ment if the motion is frivolous upon its face. However, if the defendant's
motion is not frivolous upon its face and presents questions affecting the
plaintiff's right to proceed with the cause, then the clerk's power is suspended
and he cannot enter a default against the defendant for failure to plead or
demur. 26
To justify a compulsory amendment or motion to strike, the defendant
must state in his motion that the plea complained of was framed so as to preju-
dice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the case,2 7 as the absence of these
elements in the pleader's motion or plea complained of negatives the use of
this remedy.28 However, even though the opposition has not so moved, the
court upon its own motion may require the submission of an amended plea.2 9
The granting of the compulsory amendment is discretionary and the court's
ruling will not be disturbed upon appeal unless there is a clear abuse of judicial
discretion. 30 Whenever a plea is defective and needs reformation, the motion
and the order of the court granting the motion should point out in what particu-
lars the plea is defective.81
The court could not make an order striking defendant's plea without
23. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., v. Wallace, 61 Fla. 93, 54 So. 893 (1911).
24. 30 F.S.A. 209 (1941) Common Law Ct. Rules 24.
25. Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 56 Fla. 735, 48 So. 209 (1908) (if the
allegations are wholly irrelevant then the proper remedy would be for a motion to strike).
26. Cobb v. Trammell, Governor, 73 Fla. 574, 74 So. 697 (1917).
27. Tampa Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. v. Thomas, 131 Fla. 650, 179 So. 705(1938) (compulsory amendment) ; Zorn v. Britton, 112 Fla. 579, 150 So. 801 (1933)(motion to strike).
28. Seaboard Air Line R.R., v. Rentz, 60 Fla. 429, 54 So. 13 (1910).
29. Florida East Coast R.R., v. Knowles, 68 Fla. 400, 67 So. 122 (1914).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. See note 11 supra.
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notice to the defendant. 32 Failure of the compulsory amendment to set a time
within which to amend will not prevent a dismissal of the cause.33 However,
if the other party has no notice, the court generally will not dismiss the action.
Both the motions to strike and compulsory amendment arose from the
common law special demurrer,34 and are used to attack pleadings which are
defective in form. Although the statute creating these motions is ambiguous
as to whether or not they are one and the same, the courts have implied that
they are distinct remedies and have noted the following characteristics.
(1) Motion to strike except for frivolous pleas has been used to eliminate
excessive materials from the pleading while the compulsory amendment has
been used not only to eliminate excessive material from the pleading, but to
compel the inclusion of essential facts which were omitted.
(2) The motion to strike has been used for "major" defects in the plead-
ings whereas the compulsory amendment is used for "minor" defects.
(3) The relief allowed to the movant when the motion to strike is granted
may be fatal to the party whose pleadings are defective, in that he may be out
of court. On the other hand, the relief allowed under a compulsory amendment
seems to be no more drastic than the allowance of costs to the maker of the
motion.
The real or fancied distinction between the motion to strike and the com-
pulsory amendment seems to disappear due to the fact that the court is author-
ized to make an order granting the proper relief respecting the pleading, even
though the motion is not entirely appropriate in its terms. 5
Notwithstanding the fact that the courts by their various decisions have
differentiated between the uses and functions of the motion to strike and com-
pulsory amendment, their distinction seems to be predicated upon no real or
substantial ground, unless the compulsory amendment were to be considered as
a motion for a more definite statement.
There is no clearly defined area between a motion to strike and a compul-
sory amendment. Florida appears to be the only state which allows a "motion
for compulsory amendment." An examination of the statutory language which
purportedly created this additional pleading indicated that it might just as
readily have been construed to allow a single remedy, namely, a motion to strike
with the alternative possibilities of either amending the defective pleading or
having the defective pleading stricken. The actual language of the statute is
... the opposite party may apply to the court to strike out or amend such
pleading ... 3
32. See note 12 supra.
33. Allen v. Noland, 82 Fla. 301, 89 So. 806 (1921).
34. See note 6 supra.
35. See note 10 supra.
36. FLA. STAT. § 50.21 (1941).
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Florida courts might have, with greater justification, construed that clause to
mean that, consonant with the procedure in other jurisdictions, the remedy
for attacking pleadings ". . so framed as to prejudice or embarrass or delay
the fair trial of an action .... ,'7 should be by motion to strike.
The courts have used the compulsory amendment for other purposes as
well as its use for a more definite statement, and their failure to rigorously
distinguish the basis of their decisions in the use of this motion from the
motion to strike has created a situation of vagueness and confusion to the
members of the Florida bench and bar. In the opinion of this writer, the dis-
tinctions made between a corpulsory amendment and a motion to strike are
illusory and a result of statutory misinterpretation. As said before, the diffi-
culties that were inherent in the procedure on this point may now be obviated
by the adoption of the new rules.
In conclusion. it is to be noted that the general and special demurrer grew
out of the common law demurrer; that the special demurrer gave rise to the
motion to strike and compulsory amendment; and that today tinder the new
rules those various pleadings have been replaced by Rule 13 38 motion to
dismiss, motion for more definite statement, and motion to strike as well as
Rules 14 9 and 17 40 which cover sham pleadings and misjoinder and non-
joinder. Generally, the motion to dismiss replaces the general demurrer. When
a pleading is vague instead of filing a motion for compulsory amendment, you
would file a motion for a more definite statement. And as far as the other
grounds for compulsory amendment, they would fall within the provisions of
the new motion to strike along with the grounds for motion to strike as it
formerly existed.
The recent adoption of the Florida Common Law Court Rules, as applied
to the motion to strike and motion for compulsory amendment, necessitates an
examination of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon which most of the
new rules are based. Rule 13 4! includes motion to dismiss, motion for more
definite statement and motion to strike while Rule 14 42 covers sham pleadings.
These rules have replaced the demurrer, compulsory amendment and the old
motion to strike.
Subsection (e) of Rule 13 deals with a motion for a more definite state-
ment. One of the purposes for the compulsory amendment was to remove the
ambiguities that existed in the pleadings, which is in effect the office of the
motion for a more definite statement. Rule 13 (e) states:
37. Supra.






If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a reply,
he may move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive
pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not
obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such other time as
the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was
directed or make such order as it deems just.4"
The federal courts in interpreting this rule have attempted to define
the bounds for its use. In the case of Slusher v. Jones,44.the court said that
except where pleadings are so vague or ambiguous as to preclude a fair under-
standing of the nature of the claims asserted or the relief sought, parties
should resort to written interrogatories for securing detailed or particular in-
formation in regard to claims asserted against them, rather than the more cum-
bersome procedure under Rule 12 (e)' 5 (motion for more definite statement).
Relief under this rule should be limited to allegations in a complaint which are
so ambiguous that a defendant is unable to determine the issues he must
meet. 46 Where matters relied on in a complaint were averred with sufficient
definiteness to enable the defendant to properly prepare a responsive pleading,
and the information sought by the motion for more definite statement was
peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge, the motion was denied. 47
In Westland Oil Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,4 8 the complaint
sought to recover for the destruction of property and injury to a business as
a result of fire. It alleged that certain gasoline ignited as a result of defendant's
failure to perform its obligations preparatory to and during the course of un-
loading railroad tank cars. These allegations were deemed insufficient and
defendant's motion for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars
was granted.
It is seen, therefore, that the motion for more definite statement is prop..
erly. presented only where the complaint is so vague or ambiguous or con-
tains such broad generalizations that the defendant cannot frame an answer or
understand the nature and extent of the charges so as to prepare for trial. 49
In a 1943 case5 0 the court said that a motion for more definite statement
was no longer a court favorite and other methods of obtaining pre-trial dis-
43. Supra note 38.
44. 3 F.R.D. 168 (E.D. Ky. 1943)
45. Federal Rule 12 (e) is the equivalent of our Rule 13 (e).
46. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundations v. Vitamin Technologists, 1 F.R.D. 8(S.D. Cal. 1939) ; Best Foods v. General Mills, 3 F.R.D. 275 (D.C. Del, 1943). But
cf. Koss v. Plymouth Rubber Co., 9 F.R.D. 58 (D.C. Mass. 1949).
47. Collins v. C. W. Whittier & Bros., 3 F.R.D. 20 (D.C. Mass. 1942); cf. Town-
send v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 35 F. Supp. 935 (D.C. Mass. 1940).
48. 3 F.R.D. 55 (D.C.N.D. 1943).
48. 3 F. R. D. 55 (D. C. N. D. 1943).
49. Brinley v. Lewis, 27 F. Supp. 313 (M.D. Pa. 1939); Baker v. Rose, 8 F.R.D.
193 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
50. See note 46 supra; accord, Bank of Nova Scotia v. San Miguel, 9 F.R.D. 171(D.C. Puerto Rico 1949).
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covery should be used. However, in 1948 in the case of McComb v. Hardy,51
the court felt that discovery was not always the proper remedy, and that the
motion for more definite statement was an immediate and direct way of getting
the particulars the party needed to answer the complaint.
The motion to strike in the new rules takes over many of the functions of
the compulsory amendment, as well as being used in the same manner as the
old motion to strike.5 2 Rule 13 (f) deals with the motion to strike and states:
Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a
party within 10 days after the service of the pleading upon him or upon the
court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent
or scandalous matter.5 3
The federal rule has been interpreted to hold that any pleading of redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter, or any plea which is not
germane to the issues may be stricken on a motion by the adverse party.54 In
Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken,55 in an action for debt, the defendant
set up a counterclaim which rested solely in tort. The plaintiff's defense to
the counterclaim said there was no written agreement and the contract
was in violation of the Statute of Frauds. The court said that the plaintiff's
defense stated matter which in law constituted no bar to the counterclaim and
as regards the issues in controversy, it was irrelevant, immaterial and nQt
responsive to the issues and should be stricken on proper motion. However,
although a pleading is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and literally sus-
ceptible to a motion to strike, such motion will not be granted in the absence
of some showing of prejudicial harm resulting to the adversary.5- 6
The motion to strike is still the proper course of action to remove
sham pleas which are defined in Rule 14 57 as follows:
(a) If a party deems any pleading or part thereof filed by the other party
to be a sham, he may, before the cause is set for trial, move to strike said
pleading or part thereof and the court shall hear said motion, taking evidence
of the respective parties, and if the motion be sustained, the pleading to
which the motion is directed shall be stricken. Default and summary judg-
ment on the merits may, in the discretion of the court, be entered, or he liay,
for good cause shown, permit additional filings to be filed. (b) The motion
51. 8 F.R.D. 28 (D.C. Mont. 1943). But cf. Vernor's Ginger Ale Bottling Corp.
of Boston v. Hires-Ideal Bottling Co., 8 F.R.D. 240 (D.C. Neb. 1948).
52. See note 38 supra.
53. Ibid. The comment by the committee is that Rule 13 will replace Common Law
Rule 22, and is taken largely from the Federal Rule 12, 28 U.S.C.
54. Best Foods v. General Mills, 3 F.R.D. 459 (D.C. Del. 1944).
55. 34 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.S.C. 1940) ; cf. Teiger v. Oderwald, 31 F. Supp. 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
56. Vernor's Ginger Ale Bottling Corp. of Boston v. Hires-Ideal Bottling Co., supra
(where complaint was replete with immaterial allegations) ; Sinkbeil v. Handler, 7 F.R.D.
92 (D.C. Neb. 1946).
57. 41 So.2d No. 4 (Advance Sheets Aug. 25, 1949).
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to strike shall be sworn to and shall set forth fully the facts on which the
movant relies and may be supported by affidavit. No traverse of the motion
shall be required. 68
In the case of Rhea v. Hackney,5 9 the defendant sought to delay final
judgment on promissory notes by various pleas so that other collusive judg-
ments could be entered against him which would have priority over the present
sought judgment. In holding these pleas to be sham the court said that a plea
is considered "sham" when it is inherently false, and from plain conceded facts
must have been known to the party interposing it to be untrue. Also, it was
said that a plea appearing to be good on its face, may be declared "sham" if it
is in fact known to be untrue. The power to strike sham pleadings is indispen-
sable to the court.60
In conclusion, with the adoption of the new rules, the technicalities, as illus-
trated by the distinctions made between a motion to strike and a compulsory
amendment, should become non-existent.
JACK A. FALK
58. Ibid.
59. 117 Fla. 62, 157 So. 190 (1934).
60. Guaranty Life Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Hall Bros. Press, 138 Fla. 176, 189 So. 243(1939).
